American Military History

Military as an Organization

American military power is constantly suffer compromises during fiscal tightening. We cannot afford everything, and our ability to separate the funds is simple. We can spend money on education and manpower, upgrading equipment, current missions, or the quality of life issues. Almost every item in the budget of the army comes, though roughly, in one of these elements. As in the interwar period 1918-1941, we cannot fund everything. There are, however, how we can use ideas and words, to increase the combat effectiveness without significant expenditure. There is opportunity to improve our doctrine and policy, through which we "manage" our forces. The actual tactics relate to the future army, whether the "average team" or something else is almost irrelevant to the question. Regardless of the name, we are inclined to smaller units, as our main tactical building block. This trend points to a possible solution, with deep roots in the history of the army. We can use human nature to help build cohesion, returning regiments.

While the decision of another army in a different period, the factors are applied to a person at all. Departments, for the most part, too large to cause an emotional affiliation, except when viewed in the past tense. Shelves, though the regiments such as the U.S. Army lost to the restructuring of the Potomac Army Gen. Maxwell Taylor, may serve as a basis for unity at the tactical level in the future, as they last (Bateman).

We are faced with a period of diminished personal commitment to the military and at the same time characterized by the loss of professional self-devotion for their dedication to the institution. While many of the reasons for this are related to the recent downsizing of the military and the resulting uncertainty that survivors feel about the army as a body, the consequences could be disastrous if you have installed (McCormick).

The reorganization of the traditional regimental lines may be part of the solution. This will only work, however, with a personnel policy that promotes unity and cohesion of a true regimental affiliation.

Without equivocation, we must restructure the entire system of personnel for tactical assignments of enlisted soldiers and senior officers of the company. We must create a new process that recognizes the regimental affiliation in more than name. It was tested in half-measures earlier. At this time we need to go beyond well-intentioned experiments KOREA

Cohort, and the regimental system accessories and redesign of our staff appointment and development programs with one goal: the development of cohesion at the tactical level.

Finally, we can not escape the fact that training at the tactical level, was hit hard in the last few years. Recognizing that we can not afford to do all that we would, given the limited resources provided to us by Congress, we must place it on top of our priority list and hope for the best in other areas. It will be difficult. It requires a final decision at the highest level and subsequent ironclad commitment to the ...