The Bombing of Japan - President Truman's Decision



The Bombing Of Japan - President Truman's decision

Introduction

A lot of researches support the view that top U.S. officials, understood that use of bomb was not required to end the war before an invasion. However, as Robert Messer observed in August 1985 issue of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the implications of Truman's diary as well as letters alone for the orthodox defense of bomb's use are devastating: if Soviet entry alone would end the war before an invasion of Japan, the use of atomic bombs cannot be justified as the only alternative to that invasion. The variety of options even along with expert defenders of Truman's decision is extremely suggestive.

In July as well as early August, 1945, the United States government knew three things that Japanese government did not. One was that bomb was coming into existence, had been successfully tested. One was that United States government was prepared to allow the emperor to remain on his throne in Japan, as well as the third was that Russians were coming into war. As well as the question, it seems to me, that was not fully studied, fully presented to President Truman, was whether warning of bomb as well as assurance on emperor could not have been combined in a fashion which would have produced Japanese surrender without the use of bomb on a large city, with all of human consequences that followed.

Discussion

Before August 10, Truman as well as his associates had not sought to avoid the use of atomic bomb. As a result, they had easily dismissed the possibility of a noncombat demonstration. Indeed, the post-Hiroshima pleas of Japan's military leaders for a final glorious battle suggest that such a demonstration probably would not have produced a speedy surrender. As well as American leaders also did not pursue other alternatives: modifying their unconditional surrender demand well as by guaranteeing the maintenance of emperor, awaiting the Soviet entry into war, or simply pursuing heavy conventional bombing of cities amid the strangling naval blockade.

Truman did not believe that a modification of unconditional surrender formula would produce a speedy surrender. They thought that guaranteeing to maintain emperor would prompt an angry backlash from Americans who regarded Hirohito as a war criminal, as well as feared that this concession might embolden the Japanese militarists to expect more concessions as well as thus prolong the war. As a result, the president as well as his secretary of state easily rejected Stimson's pleas for a guarantee of emperor.

Similarly, most American leaders did not believe that Soviet entry into Pacific war would make a derisive difference as well as greatly speed Japans surrender. Generally, they believed that U.S.S.R.'s entry would help end the war--ideally, before the massive invasion of Kyushu. They anticipated Moscow's intervention in mid-August, but the Soviets moved up their schedule to August 8, probably because of Hiroshima bombing, as well as the Soviet entry did play an important role in producing Japan's surrender on August ...