ETHOS OF SCIENCE

Ethos of Science



Ethos of Science

Introduction

Merton's analysis of the ethos of science has gained increased relevance because recent developments such as commercialization of research have undermined basic norms, like impartiality. It is desirable to uphold the institutional realism in Merton's sociology of science in order to grasp contemporary challenges. But central elements in his analytical approach have also to be revised or rejected, especially his nomological conception of explanations, non-cognitivism in normative issues, and failure adequately to conceptualize Homo sociologicus as a reasoner. Reasoners present and discuss cognitive claims, related both to descriptive and normative validity. Merton's analysis of an ethos of science should be evaluated as a reconstructive type of empirical analysis where the goal is insight and adequate identification of phenomena. Several critics denying the existence of Mertonian norms tacitly presuppose the validity of the norms, thereby entangling themselves in self-defeating contradictions. As an unintended consequence, these critics confirm the existence of a fundamental ethos of science.

Discussion

Robert Merton described and analyzed institutional norms of science in several contributions, starting in the mid-1930s. He claimed that there is an ethos of science, 'a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific' (1968). But was there, and is there, such an ethos of science actually influencing the behavior of scientists? Harriet Zuckerman notes that such 'seemingly innocent questions have been controversial for decades' (1988: 514). In an introduction to science studies, David Hess articulates some widely held criticisms within this interdisciplinary field, claiming that 'subsequent research failed to confirm the existence of Mertonian norms' (1968).

According to him, Merton misidentified the phenomenon, confusing 'the ideology and the practice'. Hess thinks that Merton's analysis can be saved only if understood either as the moral ideals of individuals, or as an occupational ideology for self-protection and getting support from society at large. Sal Restivo notes more generally 'a widespread sense in science studies that the Mertonian paradigm has been vanquished and relegated to the museum if not the attic' of science studies (Merton, 1996).

Such criticism is widespread, but mistaken. Merton identified a real phenomenon. His work was not only historically important, but is also essential today. There are, however, also missing and untenable elements in his approach, distort-ing his analysis of scientific norms. Merton's sociology of science lacks theoretical resources to meet three essential challenges, having to do with his positivism, theory of action and normative analysis. Merton can be criticized for a positivistic interpretation of science, assuming that scientific theories and explanations in the last instance should be of a deductive-nomological kind (Kalleberg, 2005). In the classic article on the ethos of science, a positivist interpretation can be discerned, inferred from the definition of 'knowledge' as 'empirically confirmed and logically consistent predictions' (Merton, 1968b). That is not necessarily a problem if we focus only on disciplines like physics and chemistry, but it creates irrationalities in the evaluation of cultural and social sciences.

There are new insights and approaches in the broader field of sociology and social theory, ...